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A deterministic direct quantum communication protocol by using swapping quan-
tum entanglement and local unitary operations is proposed in this paper. A set of
ordered EPR pairs in one of the four Bell states is used. For each pair, each of
the two legitimate users owns a photon of the entangled pair via quantum channel.
The pairs are divided into two types of group, i.e., the checking groups and the
encoding-decoding groups. In the checking groups, taking advantage of the swapping
quantum entanglement and Alice’s (the message sender’s) public announcement, the
eavesdropping can be detected provided that the number of the checking groups
is big enough. After insuring the security of the quantum channel, Alice encodes
her bits via the local unitary operations on the encoding-decoding groups. Then
she performs her Bell measurements on her photons and publicly announces her
measurement results. After her announcement, the message receiver Bob performs his
Bell measurements on his photons and directly extracts the encoding bits by using the
property of the quantum entanglement swapping. The security of the present scheme
is also discussed: under the attack scenarios to our best knowledge, the scheme is secure.
PACS Number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics, in which
two remote legitimate users (Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the transmission
of quantum signals. Much attention has been focused on QKD after the pioneering work of Bennett
and Brassard published in 1984 [1]. Till now there have been many theoretical QKDs[2-20]. They
can be classified into two types, the nondeterministic one [2-14] and the deterministic one [15-20].
The nondeterministic QKD can be used to establish a shared secret key between Alice and Bob,
consisting of a sequence of random bits. This secret key can be used to encrypt a message which
is sent through a classical channel. In contrast, in the deterministic QKD, the legitimate users
can get results deterministically provided that the quantum channel is not disturbed. It is more
attractive to establish a deterministic secure direct communication protocol by taking advantage of
the deterministic QKDs. However, different from the deterministic QKDs, the deterministic secure
direct communication protocol is more demanding on the security. Hence, only recently a number
of deterministic secure direct protocols have been proposed [15-16,19]. In these protocols, the
quantum entanglement plays very important roles. It is well known that quantum entanglement
swapping [21-24] can entangle two quantum system which do not interact with each other and it has
ever played very important roles in some nondeterministic QKDs[7,15]. In this paper, we present
2a deterministic secure direct communication protocol by using swapping quantum entanglement
and local unitary operations. This communication protocol can be used to transmit securely either
a secret key or a plain text message.
Let us first describe the quantum entanglement swapping simply. Let |0〉 and |1〉 be the hor-
izontal and vertical polarization states of a photon, respectively. Then the four Bell states,
|Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2 and |Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2, are maximally entangled states in the
two-photon Hilbert space. Let the initial state of two photon pairs be the product of any two of
the four Bell states, such as |Ψ+12〉 and |Ψ+34〉, then after the Bell measurements on the photon 1
and 3 pair and the photon 2 and 4 pair, since the following equation holds,
|Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Ψ+34〉 =
1
2
(|Ψ+13〉|Ψ+24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Ψ−24〉+ |Φ+13〉|Φ+24〉 − |Φ−13〉|Φ−24〉), (1)
the total initial state (i.e., |Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Ψ+34〉) is projected onto |η1〉 = |Φ+13〉 ⊗ |Φ+24〉, |η2〉 = |Φ−13〉 ⊗
|Φ−24〉, |η3〉 = |Ψ+13〉 ⊗ |Ψ+24〉 and |η4〉 = |Ψ−13〉 ⊗ |Ψ−24〉 with equal probability of 14 for each. It is
seen that previous entanglements between photons 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, are now swapped into
the entanglements between photons 1 and 3, and 2 and 4. Therefore, if |Φ+13〉 is obtained by
the Bell measurements, |Φ+24〉 should be gained affirmatively by the Bell measurements; if |Φ−13〉
is obtained, then |Φ−24〉 is arrived at; and so on. This means that for a known initial state the
Bell measurement results after the quantum entanglement swapping are correlated. In the above
example |Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Ψ+34〉 is chosen as the initial state. In fact, similar results can also be arrived at
provided that other choices of the initial states are given. As can be seen as follows:

|Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Ψ−34〉 = 12 (|Ψ+13〉|Ψ−24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Ψ+24〉 − |Φ+13〉|Φ−24〉+ |Φ−13〉|Φ+24〉),
|Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Φ+34〉 = 12 (|Ψ+13〉|Φ+24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Φ−24〉+ |Φ+13〉|Ψ+24〉 − |Φ−13〉|Ψ−24〉),
|Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Φ−34〉 = 12 (|Ψ+13〉|Φ−24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Φ+24〉 − |Φ+13〉|Ψ−24〉+ |Φ−13〉|Ψ+24〉).
(2)
By the way, for the above four known initial states the correlation of the Bell measurement re-
sults after the quantum entanglement swapping is very useful in our protocol in detecting the
eavesdropping. On the other hand, it should also be noted that different results by the Bell
measurements correspond to different initial states for the above four known initial states. For
examples, when |Ψ+13〉 and |Ψ−24〉 are obtained by the Bell measurements, the initial state should
be |Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Ψ−34〉; when |Φ+13〉 and |Ψ−24〉 are obtained by the Bell measurements, the initial state
should be |Ψ+12〉 ⊗ |Φ−34〉; and so on. Incidentally, this property is also used in our communication
protocol. In addition, it is easily verified that, the four Bell states can be transformed into each
other by some unitary operations, which can be performed locally with nonlocal effects. For exam-
ples: Let u0,u1,u2,u3 be in turn the unitary operations
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
(
0 −1
1 0
)
respectively, then |Ψ+34〉 will be in turn transformed into |Ψ+34〉, |Ψ−34〉, |Φ+34〉, |Φ−34〉 after the uni-
tary operations u0, u1, u2, u3 on anyone photon of the pair, respectively, that is, u0|Ψ+34〉 = |Ψ+34〉,
u1|Ψ+34〉 = |Ψ−34〉, u2|Ψ+34〉 = |Φ+34〉 and u3|Ψ+34〉 = |Φ−34〉. Assume that each of the above four
unitary operations corresponds to a two-bit encoding respectively, i.e., u0 to ’00’, u1 to ’01’, u2
to ’10’ and u3 to ’11’. Then, taking advantage of the quantum entanglement swapping and the
assumption of the two-bit codings, a deterministic secure direct communication protocol can be
proposed. We show it later.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the present protocol. The black dots are photons. The hollow dot means a unitary
operation has been performed on the photon. The line between two photons represents their entanglement.
(a) Bob prepares the ordered N EPR pairs. (b) Bob sends the travel photons to Alice. (c) The pairs are
divided into two types of group. ’E’ (’C’) labels the encoding-decoding (checking) groups. The checking
procedure is performed. (d) The encoding and decoding procedures are carried out.
Let us turn to depict our communication protocol. The protocol is illustrated in figure 1 and
works as follows:
(S1) Bob prepares a series of EPR pairs in Ψ+ states (say, the photon 1 and 2 pair, the photon
3 and 4 pair, etc). He takes one photon from each pair, say, the photons 2,4,6,8, etc, to form a
string of photons in a regular sequence (say, the ordered string of photons is ’2468. . . ’). He sends
the ordered photon string to Alice. In accordance with the ordering of the travel photons, Bob
stores the remainder photons by way of two photons as a group, i.e., the photons 1 and 3 as the
group 1, the photons 5 and 7 as the group 2, etc.
(S2) Alice confirms that she has received the travel photons. Also in a regular sequence, she
stores the arrived photons by way of two photons as a group in terms of their coming orders, that
is, the photons 2 and 4 as the group 1, the photons 6 and 8 as the group 2, etc.
(S3) Alice chooses randomly some photon groups as encoding-decoding groups (say, the groups
1, 2, etc) for her later two-bit encodings via local unitary u operations. The remainder photon
groups are taken as checking groups. Alice first does unitary u operations on one photon of each
checking group and then performs the Bell measurements on these checking groups.
(S4) Alice publicly announces her exact unitary u operation, her Bell measurement result and
the group order for each checking group.
(S5) Bob performs the Bell measurements on his corresponding photon groups whose orders
are same with those publicly announced by Alice. In the case of the group counterpart (i.e., the
order of Bob’s group is same with the order of Alice’s group), Bob compares his measurement
result with Alice’s measurement result. If Bob finds that each of Alice’s measurement results is
correlated with his corresponding measurement result, he publicly tells Alice there is no Eve in
the line and the communication continues to (S6). Otherwise, Bob publicly tells Alice that Eve is
4in the line. The communication is aborted.
(S6) In accord with the encoding-decoding group ordering, Alice performs her two-bit encodings
via local unitary u operations on the encoding-decoding groups according to her bit strings (say,
’0110. . . ’) needed to be transmitted this time. For instances, u1 operation on one photon of the
group 1 to encode ’01’, u2 operation on one photon of the group 2 to encode ’10’, etc. After the
unitary u operations, Alice performs the Bell states measurements on all the encoding-decoding
groups.
(S7) Alice publicly announces her Bell measurement result and the encoding-decoding group
order for each encoding-decoding photon group.
(S8) Bob measures his unmeasured photon groups in the Bell states after Alice’s public an-
nouncement in (S7). After he knows each of Alice’s Bell measurement results with the group order
and his Bell measurement results with group orders, he can conclude the exact unitary u opera-
tions performed by Alice on each encoding-decoding photon group, alternatively, he can extract
the two-bit encodings (cf. Table 1). In accordance with the photon group ordering, he can get
the bit string (i.e., the message). For example, in (S6) since Alice had performed the u1 operation
on one photon of the group 1 to encode ’01’, the initial state is then changed into Ψ+12 ⊗ Ψ−34 (or
Ψ−12 ⊗ Ψ+34, which is equivalent to Ψ+12 ⊗ Ψ−34 due to the symmetry) from the state Ψ+12 ⊗ Ψ+34.
If Alice obtains Φ+24 by her Bell measurements on her group 1, after Alice’s Bell measurement
Bob should get Φ+13 by his Bell measurements on his group 1. Since Bob can know Alice’s Bell
measurement result by her public announcement and his result by his Bell measurement, he can
conclude that Alice has performed the operation u1 and therefore extract the bits (01) (see Table
1). Similarly, he can extract other bits, then he can get the bit string ’0110. . . ’.
Table 1. Corresponding relations among the unitary u operations (i.e., the
encoding bits), the initial states, Bob’s and Alice’s Bell measurement results.
u0(00) u1(01) u2(10) u3(11)
Ψ+12 ⊗Ψ+34 Ψ+12 ⊗Ψ−34 Ψ+12 ⊗ Φ+34 Ψ+12 ⊗ Φ−34{
Φ+13,Φ
+
24
} {
Ψ−13,Ψ
+
24
} {
Ψ+13,Φ
+
24
} {
Ψ+13,Φ
−
24
}
{
Ψ−13,Ψ
−
24
} {
Φ+13,Φ
−
24
} {
Ψ−13,Φ
−
24
} {
Ψ−13,Φ
+
24
}
{
Ψ+13,Ψ
+
24
} {
Φ−13,Φ
+
24
} {
Φ+13,Ψ
+
24
} {
Φ+13,Ψ
−
24
}
{
Φ−13,Φ
−
24
} {
Ψ+13,Ψ
−
24
} {
Φ−13,Ψ
−
24
} {
Φ−13,Ψ
+
24
}
Till now we have proposed a deterministic direct communication protocol by utilizing the quan-
tum entanglement swapping and local unitary operations. To investigate the security of this
communication protocol, let us further consider some attack scenarios by Eve.
(A) Let us consider the intercept-measure-resend attacks by Eve. In this attack, Eve intercepts
the ordered photon string ’2468. . . ’. She classifies the travel photons as Alice does in (S4), i.e.,
the photons 2 and 4 as the group 1, the photons 6 and 8 as the group 2, and so on. Then she
performs her Bell measurements on each group. After her measurements, she resends the ordered
string ’2468. . . ’ to Alice. However, because of Eve’s direct measurement, the quantum entan-
5glement swapping can not be realized anymore. For examples, suppose Eve gets Φ+24 by her Bell
measurement on the photons 2 and 4, then Bob will always get Φ+13 by his Bell measurement on
the remainder photons 1 and 3. When Alice receives the photons 2 and 4 on which Bell measure-
ment has been performed by Eve, she performs first her u1 (u2, u3) operations on the checking
groups and then the Bell measurements. After Alice publicly announces her exact operation u0
(u1, u2, u3) and her Bell measurement result Φ
+
24 (Φ
−
24, Ψ
+
24, Ψ
−
24), Bob performs his Bell mea-
surement on the remainder photons 1 and 3 and gets inevitably Φ+13. Then in total Bob can find
that his Bell measurement results do not correlate with Alice’s corresponding Bell measurement
results with possibility of 3/4 corresponding to the u1, u2 and u3 operations but the occasional
correlation with possibility of 1/4 corresponding to the u0 operations. By the way, when Alice
performs her u operations on the checking groups, she can not exclude the u0 operation to de-
terministically detect Eve’s attacks for Eve can also do the u operations on the checking groups.
However, if the number of checking groups is large enough, Bob can conclude that Eve is in the
line because of the detection possibility at the level high up to 3/4. In addition, Eve can get no
information from Alice, because before Alice begins her encoding, Eve is found in the line and
accordingly the communication is aborted. Therefore, the present protocol is secure against the
direct measurement attack by Eve.
(B) Let us consider the intercept-replace attacks by Eve. Assume that Eve prepares some EPR
pairs (i.e., the photon 1′ and 2′ pair, the photon 3′ and 4′ pair, etc) in the same states as Bob
prepares, i.e., in the states Ψ+. When Bob sends the ordered photon string ’2468. . . ’ to Alice,
Eve intercepts the photon sting and replaces it by her ordered photon string ’2′4′6′8′ . . .’ taken
from her EPR pairs. After this Eve has two choices, that is, either after or before Alice’s Bell
measurements on the checking groups, she performs her Bell measurements on her photons. Let
us first consider Eve’s first choice. In this case, due to the replacement of the travel photons, the
quantum entanglement swapping can not be realized anymore, therefore there are no inevitable
correlations between Alice’ Bell measurement results on the photons 2′ and 4′ and Bob’s Bell
measurement results on the photons 1 and 3. Hence, it is easy for Alice and Bob to find that Eve
is in the line in terms of their joint actions on the checking groups. This is very similar to the
detection on Eve in (A). So in this case the present protocol is also secure. Let us turn to consider
Eve’s second choice, i.e., Eve performs her Bell measurements at first. In this case, it is obvious
that Eve can not get any information from Alice’s encoding by her prior Bell measurements. In
the following let us investigate the detection on Eve. If Eve performs her Bell measurements on
the photon 1′ and 3′ pair and the photon 2 and 4 pair, then the situation turns to her first choice.
Therefore, she should carry out her Bell measurements on the photon 1′ and 2 pair and the the
photon 3′ and 4 pair. Incidentally, her Bell measurements on the photon 1′ and 4 pair and the
the photon 3′ and 2 pair are equivalent to her Bell measurements on the photon 1′ and 2 pair and
the the photon 3′ and 4 pair due to the symmetry. The initial state of the system including Eve’s
EPR pairs is
[Ψ+12 ⊗Ψ+34]⊗ [Ψ+1′2′ ⊗Ψ+3′4′ ]
=
1
4
(|Ψ+13〉|Ψ+24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Ψ−24〉+ |Φ+13〉|Φ+24〉 − |Φ−13〉|Φ−24〉)
⊗(|Ψ+
1′3′
〉|Ψ+
2′4′
〉 − |Ψ−
1′3′
〉|Ψ−
2′4′
〉+ |Φ+
1′3′
〉|Φ+
2′4′
〉 − |Φ−
1′3′
〉|Φ−
2′4′
〉)
6=
1
4
[|Ψ+13〉|Ψ+2′4′〉|Ψ+24〉|Ψ+1′3′〉+ |Ψ−13〉|Ψ−2′4′〉|Ψ−24〉|Ψ−1′3′〉
+|Φ+13〉|Φ+2′4′〉|Φ+24〉|Φ+1′3′〉+ |Φ−13〉|Φ−2′4′〉|Φ−24〉|Φ−1′3′〉]
+
1
4
[|Ψ+13〉|Ψ+24〉(−|Ψ−1′3′〉|Ψ−2′4′〉+ |Φ+1′3′〉|Φ+2′4′〉 − |Φ−1′3′〉|Φ−2′4′〉)
−|Ψ−13〉|Ψ−24〉(|Ψ+1′3′〉|Ψ+2′4′〉+ |Φ+1′3′〉|Φ+2′4′〉 − |Φ−1′3′〉|Φ−2′4′〉)
+|Φ+13〉|Φ+24〉(|Ψ+1′3′〉|Ψ+2′4′〉 − |Ψ−1′3′〉|Ψ−2′4′〉 − |Φ−1′3′〉|Φ−2′4′〉)
−|Φ−13〉|Φ−24〉(|Ψ+1′3′〉|Ψ+2′4′〉 − |Ψ−1′3′〉|Ψ−2′4′〉+ |Φ+1′3′〉|Φ+2′4′〉)]. (3)
So after Eve’s Bell measurements on the photon 1′ and 2 pair and the photon 3′ and 4 pair,
when Alice and Bob perform their joint actions on the checking group, in each checking group the
detection possibility on Eve is also at the level high up to 3/4 due to Eve’s attacks. Therefore,
when the number of the checking group is big enough, then the present protocol is also secure
under Eve’s such attacks.
(C) Let us consider the adding-ancilla attacks by Eve. Suppose Eve can take advantage of
CNOT gate operations as used in [25] to add an ancilla to each travel photon. Then the initial
state including the ancillas is
C22′Ψ
+
12|0〉2′ ⊗ C44′Ψ+34|0〉4′
=
1
2
(|0〉1|1〉2|1〉2′ + |1〉1|0〉2|0〉2′)⊗ (|0〉3|1〉4|1〉4′ + |1〉3|0〉4|0〉4′)
=
√
2
4
[(|Ψ+13〉|Ψ+24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Ψ−24〉)|Ψ+2′4′〉+ (|Φ+13〉|Φ+24〉 − |Φ−13〉|Φ−24〉)|Φ+2′4′〉
+(|Ψ+13〉|Ψ−24〉 − |Ψ−13〉|Ψ+24〉)|Ψ−2′4′〉+ (|Φ+13〉|Φ−24〉 − |Φ−13〉|Φ+24〉)|Φ−2′4′〉], (4)
where C stands for the CNOT operation. From this equation, one can find that Eve can not
get any information form Alice’s encoding under this kind of attacks. Let us further investigate
the detection possibility on Eve. First, assume that Eve performs her Bell measurement on her
two ancilla photons before Alice and Bob’s joint actions. When Eve gets |Ψ−
2′4′
〉 or |Φ−
2′4′
〉), she
performs the local σ1 operation on one of the two travel photons. In this case, Eve can successfully
avoid the detection on her. However, her attack does not affect the communication between Alice
and Bob at all. Secondly, assume that Eve does noting but adding the ancilla photons. In this
case, for each checking group Alice and Bob can find Eve with possibility of 1/2 in terms of their
joint actions. So when the number of the checking groups is big enough, then Eve can be found
in the line. So the present protocol is also secure against such attacks.
To summarize, under the above attack scenarios to our best knowledge, the present protocol is
secure. So in this paper, we have proposed a deterministic secure direct quantum communication
protocol by using the entanglement swapping and local unitary operations. Incidentally, an alter-
native scheme of the present protocol can be achieved, i.e., different from the fact that it is always
Bob who prepares the entangled photon pairs and sends the travel photons to Alice in the present
scheme, in the alternative scheme both Alice and Bob prepare the entangled photon pair and they
send one photon of the entangled pair to each other.
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